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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) responds to thousands of alerts received each year 
from the Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT) system. Each alert 
requires an efficient and effective response to assist a potential mariner in distress. This 
thesis provides an in-depth analysis of the process employed by USCG Command 
Centers in responding to SARSAT alerts. The purpose of this analysis is to identify 
alternatives that can improve the knowledge work performed in the process. This thesis 
builds on recent work that focuses on knowledge management and system design from 
three integrated perspectives: 1) reengineering, 2) expert systems knowledge acquisition 
and representation, and 3) information systems analysis and design. The integrated 
framework covers the gamut of design considerations from the enterprise process at 
large, through alternative classes of knowledge in the middle, and on to specific systems 
in detail. The SARSAT response process is examined using this integrated framework 
and identifies five technological and organizational alternatives that offer significant 
potential to improve the overall performance of the process. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE 
This research examines Coast Guard command center processes to identify 
knowledge management organizational, and technological innovations. Processes are 
examined using current research methods that draw from business processing 
reengineering, expert systems development, and information systems analysis and design. 
This integrative framework approach provides a unique coherent knowledge management 
design methodology. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Today, the U.S. Coast Guard is a multi-mission maritime service that has 
responsibilities in five mission areas (USCG 1999): 
1. Maritime Safety. 
2. Protection of Natural Resources. 
3. Maritime Mobility. 
4. Maritime Security. 
5. National Defense. 
Coast Guard Command Centers located throughout the United States are 
responsible for providing operational oversight and support for the missions that occur 
within their area of responsibility. However, it is the Maritime Safety mission that often 
requires the most resources and efforts to be allotted by command centers. Particularly, 
the actions taken to respond to alerts generated by the Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided 
Tracking System (SARSAT). This system delivers electronic alerts from mariners who 
may be in a distress situation. Each alert is unique and requires careful analysis to 
identify the appropriate response given the current circumstances.     Coast Guard 
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Command Centers often direct an air or surface asset to investigate the alert position and 
provide assistance as necessary. Generally speaking, the process is performed well. 
However, some of the process steps are performed using manual methods and others 
require coordination between different organizational levels that can lead to inefficiencies 
in the overall process performance. 
This research takes a knowledge management (KM) approach to identify 
alternatives that offer significant potential to improve the SARSAT response process. 
Process tasks targeted for improvement are: more efficient analysis of alert messages, 
faster response decisions, and improved knowledge transfer/retention. A KM approach is 
used since it adopts a comprehensive examination of the people, process, and technology 
used by an organization that other management disciplines- may not fully consider. 
Additionally, the SARSAT process is representative of the type of knowledge work 
performed by a command center (CC), offering potential for innovations to be leveraged 
in other CC processes. 
Specifically, this thesis draws from current research that employs an integrated 
approach to knowledge management and system design (Nissen et al. 2000). This 
integrated approach also uses a redesign tool that automates key intellectual activities 
required for SARSAT process analysis. The automated redesign tool provides an 
objective examination, and increased process analysis efficiency, compared to manual 
methods. 
C.       KNOWLEDGE AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCE 
Knowledge management has emerged in recent years as a management discipline 
increasingly being adopted by the public and private sectors.   In many cases, it has 
supplanted other initiatives, such as the total quality movement and business process 
reengineering. These other initiatives flourished during the early 1990's, but have now 
become relatively ineffective in today's economy. The management community has 
come to realize that competitive advantage lies in what an organization and its employees 
know, which is at the heart of how well an organization functions (Davenport and Prusak 
1998). A driving force toward this trend has been emergence of the global economy that 
has fueled narrow profit margins, causing firms to seek out new methods to innovate and 
remain competitive. If properly designed and implemented, information technology has 
been shown to be a KM enabler, especially after the past decade of exponential growth in 
technology capabilities (e.g. processing power, disk storage, and applications). 
The rationale used by the public sector to adopt a knowledge management 
approach is also applicable to the military services. A key issue that the military has 
always grappled with is a high job turnover rate, due to yearly job transfers, separations 
and retirements. This has led the services, including the Coast Guard, to establish the 
roles of chief information/knowledge officers (CIO/CKO) and to pursue knowledge- 
management interventions of their own. However, given the lack of experience 
possessed by the Coast Guard and other services in this area, research is required to 
understand how such interventions can be applied effectively. 
D.       RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research focuses on answering the following questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
How can knowledge management interventions, both organizational and 
technological, be applied to innovate work processes performed in a Coast Guard 
Command Center? 
2. Secondary Research Questions: 
a. How is knowledge management used for process innovation in the 
military and industry? 
b. What processes are associated with Coast Guard command centers, 
and how are they currently performed? 
c. What problems or shortcomings can be identified with command 
center processes? 
d. How can knowledge management interventions be applied to 
innovate command center processes? 
e. How  should  such processes  be migrated from their current 
configuration to effect knowledge management innovations? 
f How  can the  results  of this  study  be  generalized to other 
organizations and processes? 
E. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This research focuses on examining processes associated with responding to 
distress alerts received through the Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking 
(SARSAT) system. Actions taken for these alerts are representative of the many 
functions a Coast Guard Command Center performs. It provides ample opportunity to 
examine the processes, identify interventions (both organizational and technological), and 
innovate knowledge management within Coast Guard Command Centers. 
F. METHODOLOGY 
Work for this thesis begins with conducting a literature search of books, journal 
articles, and credible Internet based sources. This thesis draws from recent research that 
focuses on knowledge management and system design from three integrated perspectives: 
1) reengineering process innovation, 2) expert systems knowledge acquisition and 
representation, and 3) information systems analysis and design. The integrated 
perspectives provide a unique framework for knowledge process and system design. 
Next, the SARSAT alert process is investigated by conducting telephone or in- 
person interviews with duty officers at Coast Guard District Eleven and District Five 
Command Centers. Responding to SARSAT alerts is analyzed from three levels (e.g. 
process, knowledge, and context), which together provide a more complete approach than 
traditional methods that often focus on just the process. 
Using the results of the three-level analysis aids in identifying innovations to 
automate and support knowledge work within the process. 
G.       ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
The remainder of the thesis is organized into four chapters. Chapter II provides 
background information on knowledge management and current efforts within the 
business and military sectors. Chapter III examines the process used by Command 
Centers in responding to SARSAT alerts. Chapter IV discusses the knowledge and 
contextual issues associated with SARSAT alerts. It also provides organizational and 
technological interventions that can innovate knowledge management at Coast Guard 
Command Centers. Chapter V follows with conclusions and recommendations. 
H.       BENEFIT OF STUDY 
This   research   identifies   process   changes   that   can   innovate   knowledge 
management within Coast Guard Command Centers and similar organizations. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
II.      KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
During the past 50 years, the American economy has undergone a significant 
transformation from an almost pure production-based value system to an intellectual and 
skill-based value system. This has placed an ever growing percentage of knowledge 
value contained within goods and services. Today, knowledge is being considered one of 
the most important strategic resources for businesses to differentiate themselves from 
their competitors. As Drucker (1995) writes, "knowledge has become the key economic 
resource and the dominant—and perhaps even the only—source of comparative 
advantage." 
In the past, knowledge was often taken for granted, and was never explicitly 
valued or managed. In today's dynamic global economy, none of the old rules apply. 
Companies must now explicitly address a range of decisions regarding the creation, 
development, and maintenance of their knowledge resources and capabilities. This has 
spawned an increasing number of public and private organizations to appoint Chief 
Knowledge Officers (CKOs) to oversee this valuable resource. To be effective, 
organizations embracing a knowledge-based perspective need to establish a strategy to 
fully leverage knowledge resources and capabilities to support their goals and mission. 
B. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT DEFINED 
Knowledge management can be an elusive topic.   Efforts to locate a precise 
definition for knowledge management result in a myriad of interpretations on what 
exactly this management discipline encompasses.   The following are a few notable 
definitions: 
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1. A discipline that "promotes an integrated approach to identifying, 
capturing, retrieving, sharing, and evaluating an enterprise's 
information assets. These information assets may include 
databases, documents, policies, and procedures, as well as the 
uncaptured tacit expertise and experience stored in individual 
workers'heads." (Gartner Group, 1999) 
2. "A process for optimizing the effective application of intellectual 
capital to achieve organization objectives." (CIO, Department of 
Navy, 2000) 
3. "Is getting the right information to the right people at the right time 
so they can make the best decisions." (Gordon Petrash, Dow 
Chemical, 1996) 
4. "Is a systematic, explicit, and deliberate building, renewal, and 
application of knowledge to maximize an enterprise's knowledge- 
related effectiveness and returns from its knowledge assets." (Carl 
Wiig, 1997) 
From these definitions we can interpret that knowledge management, as a 
discipline, treats intellectual capital as a managed asset, which can be leveraged by 
information technology (IT). 
The primary components (Hackett 1998) applied in knowledge management are 
people, processes, and technology. These components of knowledge management must 
be uniquely balanced to obtain improved performance and productivity (DOD 2000). As 
Ruggles (1998) proposes, a 50/25/25 balance of resources (people, processes and 
technology) is essential from the outset. However an organization must be mindful when 
deploying IT to consider the organizational dynamics and process(es) involved. Blindly 
employing IT will most likely fail to reap the benefits it was intended to provide. 
Looking at knowledge more closely shows that it has its roots in three primary 
areas (Fauntleroy and Klein 2000), which must be considered when developing a 
knowledge-management solution: 
1. Data: A set of discrete, objective facts about events or functional 
processes. It does not provide any inherent meaning, importance, or 
relevance. It just describes a part of what happened. 
2. Information: Consists of facts and data that are organized into a 
meaningful context to describe a particular situation or condition. 
3. Knowledge: Consists of ideas, values, insight and judgments of 
individuals. It is dynamic and can only be accessed from experts through 
direct collaboration and communication. 
These three components represent the knowledge assets an organization must 
manage in order to ensure a dynamic, innovative and agile organization.   Typically, 
organizations become focused on the lower two assets (particularly data) and employ 
databases to store large quantities of data, which by themselves, do not contribute to 
organizational knowledge.   Only when data is coupled with structure, meaning, and 
relevance does it transform into useable information.   Continuing with this evolution 
requires information to be augmented with context, reasoning and understanding to foster 
knowledge creation. 
Knowledge can take many forms, but in the literature, it is usually split into two 
general categories: 
1. Explicit: What has been written or otherwise recorded. It includes 
knowledge being codified through books, manuals, databases, reports, 
policies, and procedures. This knowledge can therefore be readily 
identified, articulated, captured, shared, and applied. 
2. Tacit: The expertise and wisdom contained within people's heads making 
it highly personal. Often, it takes the form of a mental model containing 
beliefs, intuition, and perspectives that may be taken for granted by the 
holder. 
Tacit knowledge can be extremely difficult to codify, compared to explicit 
knowledge, because the holder's knowledge is so ingrained (e.g. the craft of cabinetry), 
which makes it difficult to articulate and transfer from one individual to another. 
Therefore, much of the emphasis has been focused on developing information technology 
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(IT) systems that codify explicit knowledge (e.g. groupware, intranets, books of 
knowledge) because they are easier to develop. Capturing tacit knowledge with a IT 
system is much harder (e.g. expert systems) because it requires significant efforts before 
a system attains the ability to duplicate human capabilities. 
C.       BUILDING A LEARNING ORGANIZATION 
If organizations are going to continue to prosper in an ever changing environment, 
then it is essential that they make a commitment to learning. Many organizations are 
struggling today because they do not adapt quickly enough to respond to their rapidly 
changing markets. As Garvin writes (1993), "in the absence of learning, companies and 
individuals simply repeat old practices. Change remains cosmetic, and improvements are 
either fortuitous or short-lived." 
A learning organization can be hindered in its development if it has what Senge 
(1990) calls learning disabilities: 
1. "lam my position" - People within an organization become so focused on 
their job that they lose sight of the big picture and do not understand how 
their efforts contribute to the organization. 
2. "The enemy is out there" - When things go wrong, there is a propensity for 
people to seek out someone or something to place blame. 
3. "The illusion of taking charge" - Someone attempts to quickly tackle 
tough problems head-on before they get out of hand. However, the 
manner in addressing the problem is flawed or ill-conceived. The effort 
then becomes a reactive measure that will likely not produce the best 
outcome. 
4. "The fixation on events" - Focusing on the event leads to "event" 
explanations which are narrow in scope. Learning occurs when emphasis 
is placed on seeing the long-term patterns of change on what caused the 
events. 
5. "The parable of the boiled frog" - Boiling a frog occurs only if the 
temperature is raised slowly. Otherwise it jumps out of the pot. Likewise, 
being able to see slow gradual change (not just dramatic) is crucial, as in 
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the case of American automakers' reluctance to build fuel efficient cars in 
the early 1970's. 
6. "The delusion of learning from experience" - Some decisions (e.g. R&D 
efforts, promotion of people) provide the least opportunity for trial and 
error. Cycles are hard to observe since they occur years later. This leads 
to an over abundance of bureaucratic functional divisions created as an 
attempt to better cope with decisions. The result: analyzing cross- 
functional problems and issues becomes impossible or difficult to perform. 
7. "The myth of the management team" - Often teams spend considerable 
time fighting for "turf." To maintain a positive image, they squelch 
disagreement. People with serious reservations do not state them publicly, 
and joint decisions are watered-down compromises. These teams may 
perform routine tasks well, but under pressure, they will likely break 
down. 
By mitigating the "disabilities," an organization will then be able to leverage 
Senge's five disciplines toward building a learning organization.     The first two 
disciplines are applicable to a group or team.   The remaining three are aimed at the 
individual. The five disciplines are: 
1. Team Learning - People must suspend their assumptions and freely think 
together. That involves engaging in unfettered group dialogue to discover 
insights not attainable individually. It also involves identifying team 
interaction patterns that may hinder learning. 
2. Building Shared Vision - If organizations bind people around a genuine 
vision and sense of destiny, their people will become motivated. The 
common bond will trigger an inner drive for their people to excel, learn, 
and contribute. 
3. Mental Models - These are deeply ingrained assumptions or beliefs that 
influence how one behaves or understands the world. Often these models 
work subconsciously within individuals. Organizations must unearth 
these models and scrutinize them. They must each be validated to reflect 
shared models of the organization, their market, and their competitors. 
4. Personal Mastery - This goes beyond competence and skills. On a 
personal basis it requires continually clarifying what is important and 
seeing reality more clearly. It means approaching life as a creative work 
and living it from a creative perspective rather than from a reactive 
viewpoint. By committing to lifelong learning, one can realize results that 
matter most to them and collectively help an organization to learn. 
5. Systems Thinking - The "fifth discipline" is an ability and practice to 
consistently examine a situation from a whole system perspective, rather 
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than focusing on parts, which yield incomplete information. Using this 
conceptual framework approach reveals full patterns, and also aids 
understanding in identifying what needs to be done in order to change 
them most effectively. 
Systems thinking holds the distinction of being the "fifth discipline" since it 
serves as an integrator of all the other disciplines.  Each of these components provides 
what Senge believes is a vital dimension toward building organizations capable of 
learning and achieving their highest goals. 
Garvin (1993) takes a different approach, believing Senge's disciplines are too 
abstract and do not provide concrete guidance toward building a learning organization. 
He proposes a foundation consisting of meaning, management, and measurement (the 
"three Ms") that will serve as a basis for launching a learning organization. The first M, 
meaning, requires organizations to identify a well-grounded definition of a learning 
organization that is actionable and easy to articulate.   Next, management requires the 
organizational leaders to establish firm guidelines that are replete with operational 
direction rather than lofty aspirations.     The final M is measurement,  where the 
organization needs to employ better tools for assessing the level of learning to confirm 
their progress. With a well-established foundation, Garvin (1993) proposes that learning 
organizations can then become skilled at doing five main activities: 
1. Systematic Problem Solving - This focuses on employing a scientific 
method for diagnosing problems. Simple statistical tools such as 
histograms and Pareto charts are used to organize the data and draw 
inferences. Decision making is based on firm data instead of assumptions. 
2. Experimentation - This activity involves systematic searching and testing 
of new knowledge. It usually involves two activities: ongoing programs 
and one of a kind demonstration projects. 
3. Learning from past experience - Organizations need to continually review 
their past achievements and failures, assess them systematically, and record 
the lessons in a manner in which employees can easily locate and retrieve. 
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4. Learning from each others - This involves learning by looking outside 
one's immediate environment, such as other departments, or even different 
businesses. Looking outside the organization can be beneficial to break the 
"group think" mentality and identify unique ideas, perspectives, or foster 
creative thinking. 
5. Transferring knowledge - The organization benefits most when knowledge 
is shared quickly and efficiently so that everyone has the opportunity learn. 
Mechanisms to share knowledge include: oral/written reports, site visits 
and tours, personnel rotations, and training and education programs. All 
have their strengths and weaknesses, but the methods offering active 
involvement (e.g. personnel rotation programs) are more effective in terms 
of transferring knowledge than passive activities (e.g. reading written 
reports or tours). 
Both Senge and Garvin provide interesting perspectives on what should be 
considered in order to build a learning organization.  Of particular interest are Garvin's 
last three activities and the issues that affect them.  They are discussed in the next two 
sections. 
D.       INTELLECTUAL CAPITIAL 
The ability for an organization to learn is influenced by how well intellectual 
capital is managed. Learning occurs when different ideas, perceptions, and ways of 
processing information collide. Hiring and promoting people from the same stripe or 
background (Leonard and Straus 1997) brings together people that share similar interests, 
training and thoughts. Due to the common cognitive filters, only familiar ideas survive, 
and the others that hold potential are lost. To counter this, Leonard and Straus 
recommend that organizations seek a diverse group of people to fill their positions. The 
diversity that organizations should seek is to hire qualified individuals with different 
backgrounds who think and act differently. Bringing the diverse group of people together 
can lead to developing "creative abrasion" amongst the workers. This intentional 
combining of people with different skills, values, and ideas can elicit innovation that a 
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non-diverse workforce might not ever achieve. Additional "best practices" to managing 
intellect include: recruiting the best people, forcing intense early development of new 
workers, providing constant challenging work to foster professional growth among 
workers, and performing frequent performance appraisals (Quinn, Anderson and 
Finkelstein 1996). 
E.       TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE 
A key attribute of a learning organization is becoming adept at transferring newly 
created knowledge to make it widely available to all potential users within the 
organization. In today's economy, transferring knowledge can be a challenge due to the 
higher turnover rate of the workforce. The notion of working for just one employer until 
retirement has nearly ceased.   Economic pressure is even changing Japan's coveted 
guaranteed lifetime employment model.  Now, the changing economy has some people 
switching jobs every 3.5 years (Labor 2000), and in the high-tech industry, turnover 
occurs more frequently at around 2.5 yrs or less (ITAA 2001). Job rotation is a primary 
concern for the military services since personnel are transferred yearly due to assignment 
completion, retirement or enlistment completion.   This can lead to organizational "de- 
skilling" as knowledge workers leave the organization.    Many organizations try to 
counter this effect by codifying explicit knowledge into procedures, report, memos, and 
lessons learned. This is a start but an organization must also employ a strategy to transfer 
knowledge more effectively across time and space. This apparently has been difficult to 
do as 44% of respondents to a recent Ernest and Young survey (quoted in Brock 2000) 
reported they were either poor or very poor at transferring knowledge within their 
organization. 
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Dixon (2000) has identified five methods to effectively transfer explicit and tacit 
knowledge. Determining what transfer method to use for a particular situation is done by 
looking at the following criteria: 
1. Who the intended receiver of the knowledge is in terms of similarity in 
tasks and context. 
2. The nature of the tasks in terms of how routine and frequent it is. 
3. The type of knowledge that is being transferred. 
It is best if the receiver is somewhat familiar with the knowledge that is going to 
be transferred. If the task and context differ greatly from what the receiver is already 
familiar with, then they may not have the "absorptive capacity" (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990) to effect the transfer. When looking at the nature of the task, one should determine 
the frequency (e.g. daily, weekly, monthly), the steps that are employed, and whether the 
task is routine or non-routine. The type of knowledge being transferred (explicit vs. tacit) 
and where within the organization the transfer will have an effect, determine what 
method works best. Table 1 summarizes each of the transfer systems and provides an 
example of when a particular system should be used. 
Leading practices currently being employed to transfer knowledge are through the 
use of After Action Reports '(AARs), "lessons learned" or "learning histories." Table 1 
shows these methods would be employed during the serial, near and strategic transfer 
systems. 
The U.S Army is often credited with pioneering the use of AARs. Although 
many companies may have already been doing similar reporting, the Army takes a unique 
approach. After an event, participants meet to discuss the following (Dixon 2000): 
1. What was supposed to happen? 
2. What actually happened? 
3. What accounts for the difference? 
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Serial Transfer Near Transfer Far Transfer Strategic Transfer Expert Transfer 
Definition The knowledge 
a     team     has 
gained       from 
doing its task in 
one   setting   is 
transferred     to 
the next task in 
a         different 
setting. 
Explicit 
knowledge a team 
has   gained   from 
doing   a  frequent 
and repeated task 
is reused by other 
teams doing very 
similar work. 
Tacit knowledge a 
team   has   gained 
from      doing     a 
nonroutine  task  is 
made  available  to 
other teams  doing 
similar    work    in 
another part of the 
organization 
The collective 




strategic task that 
occurs infrequently 
but is critical to the 
whole organization. 
A team facing a 
technical question 
beyond the scope 
of      its      own 
knowledge seeks 
the  expertise  of 
others     in     the 
organization 
Similarity 
of task and 
context 
The     receiving 
team (which can 
also     be     the 
source      team) 
does  a  similar 
task  in a new 
context 
The        receiving 
team does a task 
similar to that of 
the   source   team 
and  in  a  similar 
context 
The receiving team 
does a task similar 
to that of the source 
team    but    in    a 
different context. 
The receiving team 
does a task that 
impacts the whole 
organization in a 
context different 
from that of the 
source team. 
The       receiving 
team     does     a 
different       task 
from that of the 
source team, but 




Frequent     and 
nonroutine 
Frequent         and 
routine 








Tacit           and 
Explicit Explicit Tacit Tacit and explicit Explicit 
Example A            power 
generator      re- 
placement team 
replaces          a 
generator   in   a 
chemical   plant. 
The  team  uses '. 
that  knowledge 
when  replacing 
a generator in a 
refinery. 
A    team    in    an 
Atlanta auto plant 
figures out how to 
install   brakes   in 
ten    seconds.    A 
team   in   Chicago 
use                 that 
knowledge         to 
reduce its time by 
fifteen seconds. 
Peers travel to assist 
a team dealing with 
a       unique       oil 
exploration       site. 
The    collaboration 
provides           new 
approaches. 
A company acquires 
ABC;   six     months 
later another team in 
different       location 
uses      what      was 
learned with ABC to 
acquire DFG. 
A   technician   e- 
mails the network 
asking   how   to 
increase         the 
brightness on out 
of date monitors. 
Seven       experts 
provide answers. 
Table 1. Common Knowledge Transfer Systems (After Dixon 2000). 
The military culture might lead some participants to feel that they could not truly 
speak freely. The Army quickly mitigated this issue by establishing a ground rule that 
people can speak openly, and anything said during an AAR cannot be used in any kind of 
personnel action. Naturally, any organization adopting this ground rule will need time to 
demonstrate commitment to it in order to gain trust from its people; which the Army has 
done. Often, no written record is kept of an AAR, but notes may be kept for local use. In 
special circumstances where the service as a whole could benefit, these notes are sent 
directly to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). The key to performing these 
AARs is to hold them as soon as possible after the event. Otherwise, one's recollections 
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of important facts tend to diminish as time increases. After Action Reports can be more 
effective than Lessons Learned because the latter is often a report providing the author's ( 
or a limited few) perspective. It also lacks the AAR group dynamics that can elicit more 
responses. 
In the commercial sector, AARs have been adopted at motorcycle producer 
Harley Davison (Graham 2001). However, they have made one change well-suited to a 
production or assembly environment that further improves the value of an AAR. Rather 
than wait until after production to identify best practices, they perform a limited test 
production followed by an immediate AAR. This approach allows them to identify and 
incorporate those leading practices into the production cycle to garner immediate benefit, 
rather than record them for possible use later. 
Another approach called "learning histories" (Keiner and Roth 1997) can be 
viewed as a hybrid between AARs and Lessons Learned (LL). Learning histories are 
used to summarize a major event or episode just like AARs or LL. They differ in that 
interspersed throughout the report are comments. A break in a paragraph is made and 
two columns are inserted for these comments. The right-hand column contains 
participants' recollections and those comments are identified only by job position title to 
provide some anonymity and foster frank discussion. The left column contains analysis 
and commentary by qualified outsiders. The role of the external analysis is to sort 
through the right-hand column comments to identify recurring themes, pose questions 
about assumptions and implications, and draw-out any issues not discussed that appear to 
hover just below the surface of a participant's comments. After completion, the learning 
history is used for group discussions with those involved and others who might benefit. 
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Culture is often defined as key to having an effective knowledge transfer within in 
an organization. It can be defined as the beliefs, values, norms, and behaviors that are 
unique to the organization. Developing a knowledge-sharing culture (Hackett 2000) 
relies on the following principles: 
1. Shared vision. 
2. Value-based leadership at all levels. 
3. Open and continuous communications. 
4. Rewards and recognitions. 
A survey of 431 organizations (Ruggles 1998) identified culture and top 
management's failure to signal the significance of sharing knowledge as the biggest 
impediments to knowledge transfer. 
Maintaining open and continuous communication, through formal and informal 
means, is equally important.    Informal mechanisms can often be a richer source of 
knowledge than what is provided by formal means (Weick 1995).   However, informal 
methods  are  most effective  when  the  organizational  culture  has  established  the 
appropriate "marketplace" (Davenport and Prusak 1998) to support knowledge sharing. 
Many Japanese firms, such as Dai-Ichi Pharmaceuticals (Davenport and Prusak 1998), 
have established unstructured "talk rooms" where researchers meet with colleagues to 
discuss whatever they choose for approximately 20 minutes a day.      In American 
companies, these informal gatherings usually occur around the water-cooler, at company 
picnics, or after-work at a local establishment.  These random discussions are helpful to 
stimulate creative thinking and share knowledge that a formal discussion might not elicit. 
Calling the transfer system a knowledge management initiative may inadvertently 
lead to lost support among the workers who may view it as just another management fad 
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that will pass in time. Employees can also be sensitive to names such as "lessons 
learned" and "best practices" (Dixon 2000). The former may be interpreted as just a 
repository for past failures, and workers will usually shy away from a system to avoid 
putting themselves on report. Using the term "best" can be problematic when potential 
contributors do not participate because they feel their submission is not good enough. A 
possible way around this dilemma is to use the term "leading practices." This subtle 
difference in wording can greatly effect how people react to a new system. 
People also need to be motivated to participate in the knowledge system after it 
has been deployed. Management needs to employ suitable motivational techniques to 
foster support, or it will be of little value to the organization. The motivation must 
provide real incentives rather than small enticements to get people to participate (Hansen, 
Nohria and Tierney 1999). One method that people usually respond well to is to include 
the level of participation and quality of contributions as part of an employee's 
performance review. Finally, if no politics are involved in a knowledge initiative, then it 
is likely the organization perceives it holds no significant value (Davenport 1996). 
F.        EMPLOYING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
The dramatic growth in information technology (IT) capabilities, coupled with 
attractive cost/benefits analysis, have made IT a popular investment option to support 
knowledge initiatives. Knowledge management technologies can be viewed as providing 
a supportive or performative role (Nissen et al. 2000). Most technologies fall within the 
supportive role where knowledge is organized, formalized and distributed. However, 
very few systems are capable of the more difficult performative role where knowledge is 
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created, applied and evolved. The table below is a list of common KM technologies that 
have been adopted by knowledge intensive organizations (Liebowitz 1999): 




Project Mgmt Systems 91% 
Groupware 91% 
Intranet 82% 
Knowledge-Based System 82% 
Customer Mgmt System 73% 
Skill Inventory System 64% 
Yellow Pages for Knowledge         j 44% 
Table 2. Knowledge Management Technology Adoption (From Liebowitz 2000). 
Electronic mail (E-mail) is an extremely popular tool used by organizations to 
communicate and also foster collaboration and knowledge sharing. Microsoft's E-mail 
program Outlook,® has become the de facto standard, which anyone with minimal 
"Windows" experience can use effectively. The downside of E-mail is that one can 
become easily overwhelmed with messages from known and unknown senders. 
The Internet original began as a late 1960's U.S. government research project and 
grew into the world's largest computer network serving universities, academic 
researchers, commercial interests and government agencies worldwide. This vast 
network serves as a communications backbone for users to immediately exchange data, 
audio, and/or video. 
Video-conferencing enables collaboration between users located at two or more 
different locations. Each location is configured to display a visual presentation of the 
other remote participant locations. The visual experience that participants take away 
from a video-conference helps forge stronger, more productive and meaningful ties 
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between participants who have previously met in-person. Davenport and Prusak (1998) 
state that videoconferencing helps to maintain a sense of trust and direct personal contact 
that far exceeds that of phone calls, email and memos. 
Project Management Systems provide users with a centralized view of project 
related information, such as budget, status, documents, deliverables, meeting minutes and 
tasks. This results in less project management overhead, so managers can devote more 
time to decision-making and solving problems, and less time to managing day-to-day 
project details. Users become more focused and informed, allowing them to see the big 
picture, while working on their individual tasks. Another benefit is that the systems can 
enhance project communication among members. Microsoft® Project is one product that 
can perform this function well. 
Groupware is a broad term to denote computer software that support groups of 
people engaged in a common task It provides an interface to a shared environment. The 
technology may be used to foster collaboration, coordination, and information sharing 
between groups of people. "Lotus Notes" is often credited as the first groupware and 
claims to have attracted millions of users. It is now facing stiff competition from 
Microsoft® products such as Exchange and Outlook® 2000 (Ruber and Sherman 2000). 
An intranet can be viewed as a limited access Internet developed for in-house use 
within an organization. Often sensitive or proprietary information is offered through 
databases, shared folders and documents. Users within an organization can still access 
sites on the Internet, but special equipment (e.g., firewall) is usually employed to function 
as a filter for keeping outsiders from gaining access into a firm's intranet. 
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Knowledge-based systems (KBSs) are computer programs (e.g., decision support 
systems, expert systems) that embody a substantial amount of knowledge about a topic. 
These systems use the knowledge to mimic the manner in which humans perform a task 
in an attempt to duplicate "expert" performance (Playle and Beckman 1996). This is 
achieved by programming the KB S with rules dictating how to apply the knowledge, 
allowing repeatable reapplication of the knowledge to problems.  KBSs facilitate 
organizations capturing knowledge and expertise that is volatile, subject to loss due to 
personnel turnover or forgetfulness.   However, KBSs have a finite capability and can 
easily fail or produce erroneous results if the user moves outside the knowledge domain. 
Capturing the knowledge can also be difficult and tedious, requiring extensive human 
intervention. And, the KBS can become outdated if it does not have a learning capability. 
Customer management systems are often employed to strengthen customer 
relationships by automating important functions. This can result in gaining a competitive 
advantage through increased customer satisfaction, higher productivity, and lower costs. 
Popular systems include Remedy® Customer Support and Primus® eSupport. 
Skill inventory systems are online databases that contain information on who, 
within an organization, holds proficiency in a particular skill. The military services have 
a long history of employing these types of systems to track personnel with specific skill 
qualification codes (e.g., C130 engine mechanic, computer system administrator, etc). 
However, access to data held by these systems is normally restricted to the Assignment 
Officers located in the personnel departments. 
A yellow pages directory for knowledge is similar to skill inventory except it 
takes a broader approach on identifying personnel who have knowledge or understanding 
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of a particular subject. Users of the yellow paging system can then identify the person 
within the organization to assist in problem solving and/or decision-making. Research 
indicates that large centralized databases tend to be underutilized compared to smaller 
distributed systems developed for local organizational use. Information is more relevant, 
current, and has a higher success rate of bringing people together, compared to the 
centralized system approach (Hackett, 2000). 
It is often repeated in the literature that employing technology by cosfhenefit 
analysis alone is not adequate to identify system suitability and will likely fail to produce 
the desired results (Keil and Markus 1994). Failed knowledge management initiatives 
often occur due to the temptation to focus efforts on more tangible aspects such as IT and 
pay less attention to people and work processes the IT will support. 
G.       KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEM DESIGN 
Today, the successful organizations are the ones that view knowledge work from 
a process perspective (Davenport et al. 1996). The process approach allows an in-depth 
look at how best to structure, sequence, and measure knowledge work in order to achieve 
the desired results. The key to this approach is employing a methodology that looks not 
only at the underlying work activities, but also examines the organizational dynamics 
associated with the process. The resulting analysis can then be used to design 
information technology systems to best support or enable knowledge work. 
Recent literature (Nissen, Kamel, Sengupta 2000), shows how three 
complementary design methods can be integrated to address knowledge management. 
These design methods are drawn from the fields of business processing reengineering 
(BPR), expert systems (ES) development, and information systems (IS) analysis and 
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design.    Collectively they play a key role in establishing an integrated knowledge 






Process analysis & (re)design 
Knowledge analysis & representation 
Contextual analysis 
 IS analysis & design 
Table 3. Integrative Framework Methodology. 
Before analysis can begin, an enterprise level process associated with knowledge 
work must be selected. It is best to select key business processes because they directly 
support meeting the organizational mission and goals and therefore hold the greatest 
potential for benefit. 
1. Process Analysis 
This step evolves examining the process analysis using customary reengineering 
methods (e.g. Davenport 1993, Hammer and Champy 1993, Harrington 1991) that focus 
on work-flows termed "horizontal processes." These processes are generally depicted 
using directed graphs (Figure 1) to show the horizontal progression within a process. 
Understanding the process and the associated knowledge is necessary before designing 
supporting information technology systems. 
f Task\ /   Task \ \v Task f Task \ 
Figure 1. Horizontal Process Analysis. 
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The analysis may indicate a need for the process to be redesigned. If so, an 
automated measurement driven redesign method (Nissen 1998) called KOPeR can be 
employed to identify and treat process pathologies. 
2.        Knowledge Analysis 
The next step is to identify the underlying knowledge required to support the 
enterprise process. Graphically this can be depicted by extending the horizontal process 
diagram to reflect its performance through time, space, and across different workers or 
teams. The extended process representation (Figure 2) also includes vertical processes 
that interact with the horizontal work flows. While the latter emphasizes performance of 
the workflow, the vertical cross-process flows are what affect the consistency and 
efficacy of the enterprise process. 
Vertical Processes 
<s^<*^<&^® § § 5H? 
Time 
Horizontal Processes             '-i 
'       < '      i '        ' r 
i [  ®-^®~^©-^®     [ '       i '      ' '        i r 
Figure 2. Extended Process Representation (After Nissen, Espino 2000). 
Identifying the vertical processes begins by first identifying the .organization's 
overarching goal that the enterprise process is to accomplish. Correctly identifying the 
desired outcome or goal is essential since it is used to identify the Critical Success 
Factors (CSFs) that must be achieved for successful accomplishment of the horizontal 
process.   Finally, the CSFs aid in identifying the vertical processes that contain the 
knowledge required to perform the work by people or different teams throughout the 
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organization at any time.   Therefore, the vertical processes hold significant potential to 
influence the outcome of the enterprise process and must be analyzed, understood, and 
possibly even redesigned to best support knowledge management within the organization. 
3.        Contextual Analysis 
The third step of integrated framework requires assessing the contextual factors 
associated with the enterprise-process. Here, an assessment is performed to gain an 
understanding of the organization and the nature of the knowledge underlying the task. 
More specifically, an analysis is done to identify how the organizational memory is 
maintained through formal and informal means. In addition, the assessment looks at how 
the organization is structured, what knowledge transfer practices are employed, and what 
incentives are in place to foster retention and updating of knowledge. This analysis is 
important since the contextual factors also influence how knowledge systems are 
designed, introduced, and used by an organization. 
4.        Information System Analysis and Design 
Step four incorporates the results from the prior three steps (e.g. process, 
knowledge, and context) for identifying system requirements to facilitate designing of a 
system. The new system serves as an enabler for knowledge work, and its true worth 
hinges on how well the analysis was performed within the integrated framework. 
H.       KNOWLEDGE-BASED    ORGANIZATIONAL    PROCESS    REDESIGN 
(KOPeR) 
KOPeR   (Nissen   1998)   is   a  knowledge   based   system   (KBS)   that   uses 
measurement-driven inference for automated process analysis.   It incorporates process 
measures from many fields to include: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, 
Organization Behavior, and Total Quality Management.     This wide collection of 
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measures keeps the tool independent from reengineering-specific methods and increase 
its robustness. The activities often associated with process redesign are shown below. 





T ID Process I 
Generate! redesigns Diagnose pathologies 
Match 
transformations' 
Figure 3. KOPeR Redesign Methodology (From Nissen 1998). 
The evolutionary or spiral flow represents a blend of expert reengineering 
methodologies (e.g. Davenport 1993, and Hammer and Champy 1993). KOPeR is 
employed for steps 3-5 to automate process measurement, pathology diagnoses, and 
transformation matching. 
Using this KBS can significantly speed up the time spent during process analysis 
and redesign. KOPeR requires the user to input process attributes as shown in Table 4. 
This KBS employs expert system technology to automatically diagnose process 
shortcomings and provide recommendations that can generate significant performance 
improvements. Before a recommendation is made the redesign alternatives are compared 
against the process baseline to evaluate their performance. The KOPeR method suggests 








Number of nodes in longest path 
Number of distinct paths 








Number of nodes in process model 
Number of cycles in graph 
Process size divided by Length 
Number of IT-support attributes 




Number of IT-automation attributes 
Number of unique agent role attributes 
Number of inter-role edges 
Number of unique agent organization attributes 
Number of unique activity value chain attributes 
Table 4. KOPeR Process Inputs 
Key measurements are assigned values by KOPeR that represent the level that a 





Definition and Value Ranges 
The degree to which a process follows a sequential path. 
1.0 (Sequential process) - Greater than 1 (Parallel process) 
The level of process fragmentation produced by handing off 




The level of rework produced when checking is used to ensure 
quality. 0.0 (No friction)-1.0 (High friction) 
The level of IT available to support the process such as 
computers systems. 0.0 (Inadequate) - 1.0 (High) 
The level of IT communications available such as email, voice, 
shared databases/networks. 0.0 (Inadequate) - 1.0 (High) 
The level of IT available to automate the process such as expert 
systems and intelligent agents. 0.0 (Inadequate) - 1.0 (High) 
Table 5. Definitions of KOPeR Measures and Pathologies 
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From these measures KOPeR makes recommendations for redesign. Such 
recommendations may be to employ more information technology or to reduce the 
number of handoffs. KOPeR does have some limitations. It does not have the capability 
to discern whether or not a detected process pathology is acceptable. For example, a 
process may be identified as being "too sequential." However, the process steps involved 
may be mutually dependent on each other requiring a sequential flow. 
I. SUMMARY 
The previous discussions provide a comprehensive review of knowledge 
management. A particular emphasis is placed on recent research (Nissen et al. 2000) that 
proposes an integrated approach to knowledge management and system design. This 
methodology, coupled with the KOPeR analysis tool, will be used to examine the 
SARSAT process to identify alternatives that offer significant potential to enhance the 
knowledge work associated with responding to SARSAT alerts. The goal is to identify 
organizational and technological interventions that can improve decision-making, 
knowledge retention, transfer, and sharing which, in turn, facilitate an increase in overall 
performance of the process. 
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IIL    CURRENT PROCESS 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The COSPAS-SARSAT* satellite system (NOAA 2000a) is designed to 
monitor and process emergency signals originating from an aircraft, ship, or person in 
trouble. The system became operational in the 1980s as a cooperative effort between the 
United States, Canada, France and the former Soviet Union. Over the years, membership 
has grown, and there are currently 33 member nations providing support to the system. 
COSPAS-SARSAT has been able to drastically reduce the amount of time required to 
locate and assist people in distress. This has resulted in many people being saved who 
otherwise may have died. Since becoming operational, the system has been credited for 
rescuing 4,000 persons in the USA and over 11,000 worldwide. COSPAS-SARSAT 
(Figure 4) currently consists of 11 satellites, 44 ground receiver stations called local user 
Figure 4. COSPAS-SARSAT System (From NOAA 2000). 
1
   COSPAS - Cosmicheskaya Systyema Poiska Avariynich Sudov...translated from the Russian 
language this means "space system for the detection of vessels in distress." 
SARSAT -Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking 
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terminals (LUTS), and 22 mission control centers (MCCs). Upon detection of a distress 
signal, the receiving satellite relays the signal to a LUT. The LUT then relays the alert to 
the area MCC, which in turn forwards it to the appropriate search and rescue center for 
action. 
The system detects signals from users equipped with emergency radio beacons. 
There are three kinds of emergency radio beacons: 1) aircraft are installed with 
Emergency Locator Transmitters (ELTs), 2) ships use Emergency Position Indicating 
Radio Beacons (EPIRBs), and 3) Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) are used by people 
taking part in remote inland activities, such as mountain climbing or canoeing. The 
system uses Doppler processing techniques (using the relative motion between the 
satellite and the beacon) to determine the user's location. The first satellite pass results in 
what is known as an A or B solution, meaning the user position is in one of two places. 
A second satellite pass is needed to resolve the ambiguity and determine the approximate 
beacon position. 
The first generation of beacons, mostly ELTs, transmit on 121.5 MHz. These 
signals can be processed by the COSPAS-SARSAT system. However, the satellites are 
limited in their capability in relaying all 121.5 MHz signals. During a satellite pass, there 
must be a LUT or ground station "in view" to immediately receive the relayed signal. 
Since the satellite has no alert storage capability, it will experience a "missed pass" if no 
LUT is available. Another deficiency is that the satellites cannot differentiate between 
actual 121.5 Mhz alerts or a same frequency spurious signal often generated by an 
unknown source. As a result, there is an extremely high false alarm rate. In addition, the 
121.5 alerts do not provide any owner registration information to assist search and rescue 
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personnel. This causes a considerable amount of time and resources to be expended 
investigating these signals. For these reasons, COSPAS-SARSAT authorities are 
planning in 2009 to phase out the processing of these 121.5 Mhz signals in favor of the 
newer 406Mhz beacons. This long phase-out period should provide mariners with 
sufficient time to make the transition. 
The second generation of radio beacons developed to be more readily detected by 
satellites, transmit on 406 MHz. Alerts transmitted by these beacons can include vital 
encoded information: such as the registered owner, type of vehicle (aircraft or vessel), 
and country of registration. Unlike the 121.5 MHz beacons, the orbiting satellites have a 
capability to "store and hold" the 406 MHz alerts should a LUT not be visible at the time 
of receipt. The alert can then be held and relayed at a later time when a ground station is 
in-view. The processed signal results in a position error no greater than 1 to 3nm, which 
is much better compared to 12-16nm for 121.5 Mhz beacons. All these features make it 
much easier for search and rescue forces to respond to 406 MHz type distress signals. 
The following table shows a comparison between the beacons regarding the high 
number of alerts received and responded to by SAR authorities in the United States. 
SARSAT Alerting System 
Alerts received in United States between 1996 — 2000 
Initial     Composite    Actual 
Alerts        Alerts      Distress 
Lives 
Saved 
121.5 & 243 MHz   471,358         51,713          801 288 
406 MHz            12,793           4,882          999 1,281 
Table 6. SARSAT Alert Statistics (From USCG 2000). 
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As shown above, the 121.5/243 MHz beacons have an extremely high false alarm 
rate. A composite alert results after a second successful satellite pass resolves the 
positioning ambiguity (initial alerts result in two possible locations) and identifies the 
correct position. Each alert is responded to by following specific procedures appropriate 
for the beacon type, and whether it is a new or subsequent alert for an existing case. 
SARSAT alerts are sent to a Coast Guard Command Center that has jurisdiction 
for the location where the alert originates. Command centers are located at Coast Guard 
Districts throughout the United States and have an area of responsibility (AOR) spanning 
several states as shown in Figure 5. 
Commandant 



















Figure 5. USCG Area/District Organizational Breakdown. 
These command centers maintain 24 hour operational oversight and support for 
all ongoing missions (including SARSAT alerts) within their respective AOR. The Coast 
Guard accomplishes its missions using a myriad of assets that include cutters, boats and 
aircraft. The larger cutters (e.g., Medium and High Endurance) are assigned to Area 
units, and Districts control the patrol boats, buoy tenders, helicopters, and fixed wing 
aircraft. 
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B.       PROCESS DESCRIPTION 
Responding to S ARS AT alerts follows seven major steps, each containing 
specific tasks. These process steps are summarized below: 
1. Receive the Alert 
2. Analyze the Alert 
3. Search and Rescue Mission Coordinator (SMC) Decision 
4. Alert Decision 
5. Deploy Asset 
6. Response Decision 
7. Case Documentation 
This seven step process is summarized in Figure 6. Below each step is a list of 
attributes to identify the following process elements: 
1. Activity name. 
2. Role of the agent responsible for its performance. 
3. Organizational affiliation of the agent. 
4. Technology   employed   for   process   support,   communications,   and 
automation. 
The attributed graph contains the basic information that will be used later during 
process analysis. 
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Figure 6. Process of Responding to SARSAT Alerts. 
The Coast Guard responds to thousands of SARSAT alerts each year.  They are 
each aggressively pursued in accordance with USCG policies to ensure a rapid and 
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effective response. The procedures to which command centers adhere have evolved from 
experience and lessons learned.   Responding appropriately to SARSAT alerts is crucial 
since a mariner could be in distress and in need of assistance. The following details the 
process of responding to SARSAT alerts: 
1.        Receiving an Alert 
Alerts are processed and relayed by U.S. Mission Control Center (USMCC) 
located in Suitland, Maryland, to the appropriate Coast Guard District Command Center. 
Relaying an alert is an automated process. The USMCC computers generate an alert 
message and transmit it over a dedicated communication line to the receiving command 
center. Incoming alerts are immediately routed to a dedicated printer for retrieval. The 
command duty officer (CDO) is notified of an alert arrival and will then assign it to a 
duty officer for further analysis. The work flow and the associated attributes for this 
stage is shown in following Figure 7. 
Feedback Loop 







Figure 7. Receiving SARSAT Alert. 
2.        Analyze the Alert 
The incoming alert is immediately analyzed after its receipt. A duty officer will 
be looking to determine the type of alert, whether it is a new or subsequent alert 
generated by another satellite pass, and where it plots geographically. Plotting the 
latitude and longitude is done using specialized search planning software. The CDO may 
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assist in the analysis or will confirm the findings identified by an assistant duty officer. 
Identifying the precise geographical position is crucial as it will be a primary factor for 
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Figure 8. Analyzing SARSAT Alert. 
3.        SMC Decision 
Identifying who will be the SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC) is an important first 
step at this stage. Officially, the SMC is the designation referring to the responsible party 
who will oversee and coordinate the case. This is normally the department head for the 
District Office of Search and Rescue (OSR). By default, the District automatically 
assumes the SMC by just receiving the alert. Handing-off the SMC to a district unit 
(such as a Group) may be permitted if the receiving unit is in closer proximity to the 
incident and has the resource capability in terms of people, equipment, training and 
experience. At this time, Coast Guard Districts within the Atlantic Area have a policy to 
maintain SMC at the District level. The SAR procedures for the Pacific Area allow for 
some flexibility. For example, District 11 immediately transfers SMC to a Group unit for 
SARSAT alerts plotting within their respective area of responsibility. When passing the 
SMC, the District will fax the alert to the Group Operations Center. The commanding 
officer of the unit will assume SMC and provide an appropriate response. This SMC 
exchange will be followed by a telephone call to confirm fax receipt and ensure a positive 
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handoff. Subsequent alerts for this case will be relayed by the District Command Center 
using this fax/phone procedure. District OSR is briefed regularly on the actions taken. 
This may be done in person, by phone or pager. A summary of this step is shown in 
Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. SAR Mission Coordinator Decision. 
4. Alert Decision 
After analysis is complete, a decision is made on what action must be done. The 
unit assuming SMC will immediately issue an Urgent Marine Information Broadcast 
(UMIB) on VHF marine radio band channel 16.   This local broadcast notifies nearby 
mariners of the beacon activation and its approximate location, and also requests those 
able to render assistance.   Concurrently, a decision is being formulated in accordance 
with Coast Guard procedures.    Duty officers will refer to the appropriate "Quick 
Reference Sheets" (QRS), which are 1 to 3 pages in length and provide guidance on 
quickly identifying actions that must be taken.  Many factors such as weather, distance 
offshore, availability and suitability of a particular asset are considered.    Generally, 
helicopters (H60 or H65) are used to respond to alerts plotting within 100 miles. A C130 
fixed wing aircraft is used for long range cases and to provide a helicopter safety escort 
for missions exceeding 60 miles offshore. Underway surface assets such as a patrol boat 
may be diverted if they can provide a quick response.   The smaller boats (e.g. 41 foot 
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Utility boat) normally investigate alerts plotting within harbors and close to shore.  All 





















Figure 10. Alert Decision. 
5.        Deploy Asset 
The SMC of the case will provide a general Search Action Plan (SAP) and will 
direct an air or surface asset to proceed directly to the position provided in the latest alert 
message. While en route to the alert position the crew will attempt to "home" in on the 
beacon by using directional finding (DF) equipment. The DF signal is instrumental 
since there can be significant error between the alert message and the actual beacon 
position. Should a mariner be located in distress, the SMC will be contacted via radio 
and a decision will be made on how best to provide assistance. If no distress indication 
is found at datum, the initial SAP will be implemented to search the general area to 
















-On scene Unit 
—District 
-Unit equipment 
Figure 11. Deploy Asset. 
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6.        Response Decision 
A response decision will be made based on feedback provided by the on scene 
unit. The on scene unit provides vital input to the SMC recommending how the case 
should be executed and what assistance can be provided. Factors such as on scene 
weather and remaining fuel (major aircraft consideration) are provided by the Aircraft 
Commander (AC) or the Office In Charge/Commanding Officer (OIC/CO) of a cutter. 
At this point, the alert may be classified as an actual distress, in no imminent 
danger, a false alarm, or unlocated. The SMC will make a decision based on the severity 
of the situation. That may include removing persons from a sinking vessel, medical 
evacuation (MEDEVAC) of an injured or ill person, providing dewatering pumps, or 
assisting in towing a disabled vessel where no commercial assistance is readily available. 
For the other situations, units will be directed to locate and quickly secure those beacons 
that have been accidentally activated. This is necessary because these beacons continue 
to radiate a DF signal, which could interfere in locating another beacon where an actual 
emergency may exist. These steps are summarized in Figure 12. 
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Coast Guard procedures require the SMC to maintain a chronological (CHRONO) 
record during the entire case. These logs serve as a working document to record actions 
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and decisions taken during the case. Afterwards, a CHRONO is used to type a Situation 
Report (SITREP) that summarizes the entire case. After SMC review, these documents 
become part of the official case file and the report is sent to the parent organization. 














Figure 13. Case Documentation. 
8.        Process Summary 
The command center duty officers work as a team to formulate a response in 
accordance with the SMC and established Coast Guard procedures. This facilitates the 
movement of a surface or air asset within minutes after receipt of an alert. The 
geographic position of the alert determines how quickly the Coast Guard responds. 
Helicopters are usually used since they provide a rapid response and can arrive on scene 
for local area alerts in as quickly as 30 minutes after alert receipt. Response time for 
alerts plotting in remote areas take longer due to lengthy transit times. On average, most 
alerts are resolved within 2 hours. 
The process outlined shows how one alert is processed. It normally requires 
multiple alerts to resolve a case. 121.5/243 Mhz beacon alerts can take 3 satellite passes, 
or more, and a considerable amount of analysis before they are resolved. This is due to 
the inherent error in approximating beacon locations and other frequency interference. 
For such cases, a mariner is not normally found in distress.   A responding unit has 
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already searched the alert positions and has often tracked the signal to a harbor or inland 
to a local airport where a shore team is used to locate the beacon. 406 Mhz beacons have 
much greater positioning accuracy and can often be located by the second complete 
satellite pass. It is not uncommon for a Coast Guard District to be concurrently SMC for 
3 or more distinct alerts within their area of responsibility. 
C.       AUTOMATED PROCESS ANALYSIS 
The S ARS AT process is analyzed using a knowledge based system (KBS) that 
performs measurement-driven inference (Nissen 1998). This KBS tool (called KOPeR) 
automates the key intellectual activities required for process redesign: process 
measurement, pathology diagnosis, and transformation matching. The motivation for 
using this tool is that it provides an objective examination to identify transformations that 
can improve the process. Compared to manual analysis methods, it can be a more 
effective approach that yields results in a fraction of the time. 
Process analysis on the SARSAT alert process is done using KOPeR-Lite. The 
lite version represents a re-implementation of core KOPeR functionality for the PC 
environment and is accessible through a web-based interface. KOPeR-Lite contains a 
limited portion of the domain-independent knowledge originally formalized in KOPeR. 
But, it still effectively demonstrates measurement-driven inference for process analysis 
and redesign. SARSAT process measurements, values, diagnoses, and recommendations 
are summarized in Table 7. 
The first pathology identified involves parallelism with a value of 1.0. This 
indicates that the process may be hindered from steps being completed in a sequential 
manner. Redesigning the steps to combine or complete activities in parallel would be a 
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Measurements Value Diagnosis Recommendations 
Parallelism 1.000 Sequential Process Delinearize 
Handoffs fraction 0.130 Ok None 
Feedback fraction 0.261 Checking Complexity Job empowerment 
IT Support 0.391 Manual Increase 
IT Communication 0.435 Paper-based Increase 
IT Automation 0.043 Labor Intensive. Increase. Requires substantial IT infrastructure (support/comms) 
Table 7. Diagnostic Measures for SARSAT Alert Process 
normal remedy. However, the tasks with the SARSAT process are mutually dependent 
on each other, and one cannot be readily started before the preceding is complete. For 
example, analyzing an incoming alert message must be completed before a response can 
be formulated. 
The next process pathology concerns handoffs fraction or the amount of inter- 
agent workflow involved in completing the process. The score for this measure can 
range from zero (no handoffs) to one, indicating process fragmentation. KOPeR assigned 
a measured value of 0.13, which is considered acceptable. 
Feedback fraction is measured at 0.261 indicating a need to reduce the amount of 
checking. KOPeR recommends that individuals be empowered to make more decisions. 
Military organizations suffer from this problem due the nature of their missions, 
organizational structure, and tradition. To mitigate the checking issue, command centers 
should maximize their efforts to establish "briefing thresholds" clarifying specifically 
what must be briefed to the chain of command before proceeding. These decisions could 
then be made internally by the command center. Another method to reduce feedback is 
to immediately pass SMC to a Coast Guard Group for SARSAT alerts occurring within 
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their area of responsibility (AOR). Having the SMC at the group level reduces the 
feedback friction caused when units need to constantly relay/brief actions to their District 
Command Center. 
The final three measures are associated with the level of information technology 
employed during the process. The first measure identifies IT for support as inadequate 
(0.391).  This is due to the nature of the workflow being a knowledge-intensive manual 
process. Next, IT for communications is also measured as being inadequate (.0435). Of 
particular note is that IT is not generally used throughout the process for case 
documentation, but instead, forms are filled out manually. The final measure is the level 
of IT used for automation (0.043). KOPeR diagnoses the process as being labor intensive 
and recommends additional IT systems. Automating the SARSAT alerts to be displayed 
upon receipt would be a significant measure to free the worker from manually plotting. 
Other search planning systems (called AMS and CASP) are available that automate some 
individual tasks, but they are infrequently used in the process since most search and 
rescue cases don't require extensive searches.  Additionally, command centers have the 
AMVER database system which tracks commercial ship voyages and can be called as a 
responding resource to assist in long-range or remote alerts. 
D.       PROCESS ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
The KOPeR redesign agent is used to measure the process, identify shortcomings, 
and make recommendations. KOPeR suggested 5 transformations to improve the 
SARSAT process. Transformations the can be incorporated into the process include job 
empowerment and increasing the amount of information technology. Although IT is 
already employed, expanding the use of technology can increase the speed in performing 
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a task, reduce potential for human error and aid decision-makers in formulating an alert 
response plan. 
This chapter provides an in-depth examination of the SARSAT alert response 
process. The seven steps within the SARSAT process are first discussed individually and 
then the entire process is evaluated using the KOPeR KBS. This completes the first step 
of integrated framework discussed in Chapter Two. The next chapter examines the 
knowledge required to perform the SARSAT process, how it is managed, and the 
contextual issues associated with the process. 
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IV.    KNOWLEDGE AND CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
A.       KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS 
Looking at processes in the knowledge management (KM) context consists of 
extending the horizontal process with vertical processes that influence performance 
through time and across different command center watch teams. These vertical processes 
(Figure 14) are obtained by examining the enterprise process from a macro perspective to 
identify key knowledge contributing sources. By examining the supporting processes, 
effective methods to distribute and retain knowledge can be identified to aid decision 
makers in accomplishing their work. 
Watch Team 1 
Watch Team 2 ♦ T T * ♦ 
v   ®—©—<s>--® D D U u L 
Figure 14. SARSAT Alert Vertical Processes. 
The figure shows the cross-process flow for two instantiations of the main 
process. Activities within an instantiated horizontal process are depicted as lettered 
nodes. The first instantiation shows Watch Team 1 performing each of the process 
activities at some point of time. Later, another instantiation occurs with Watch Team 2 
performing the same process activities.   Using the Dixon framework, this would be 
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classified as a serial transfer of knowledge between the two watch teams. The focus here 
is on the consistency and efficacy across the process instantiations. While the horizontal 
process focuses on performance of the work itself, the proficiency of the vertical cross- 
process flows dramatically influences the process of knowledge management. 
A description and analysis of the vertical-flow processes appears below: 
1. Watch Qualification 
2. Assignment to a Watch Schedule 
3. Training 
4. After Action Reviews 
5. Information Technology Support 
1.        Watch Qualification 
Personnel go through a rigorous training program before they are designated as a 
Command Center Duty Officer.   Each command center has tailored a specific training 
program, but they are similar in nature.   Generally, it is a four-phase program, which 
averages approximately 3 months to complete and has a heavy emphasis on search and 
rescue.   The first phase involves independent study to become familiar with USCG 
policies, procedures, local geographical area and outlying units   (e.g. groups, stations, 
cutters and aircraft). The second phase involves the trainee augmenting a watch team to 
perform on the job training (OJT). A trainee at this point is under constant supervision. 
The OJT provides the opportunity to interact with experienced duty officers to garner the 
rich tacit knowledge they possess.    During phase three, the amount of oversight is 
significantly scaled back.  This creates the most realistic environment for the trainee to 
further develop and gain experience. Phase four is the final point where qualification is 
sought.   This is attempted after all training tasks have been completed and requires 
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successfully passing a written and/or oral test. In addition, the trainee must complete a 
three-week course in Maritime Search and Rescue Planning. 
2.        Assignment to a Watch. 
Each command center has a set number of duty officers assigned to a watch. This 
assignment is driven by many factors, such as historical case load. For example, District 
11 has three people assigned to each watch, consisting of two Assistant Duty Officers 
(ADO) and a Command Duty Officer (CDO). 
Upon reporting for work, a shift relief process is initiated to facilitate a seamless 
changeover of personnel. Generally, the on-coming officer will perform the following: 
1. Read the current operations brief to gain familiarity with what happened 
the prior day. This is important because there are usually cases or issues 
that carry over from the previous day and can influence current operations. 
2. Review the status of district surface and air assets noting those that are 
deployed, scheduled to conduct patrols, and any maintenance issues that 
could effect asset availability. 
3. Read the watch "pass-down" log. It often contains unique time-sensitive 
information that affects current or future operations. 
4. Read through all of the active case chronological logs and incident sheets. 
This is necessary to obtain a firm understanding of the current cases. 
After doing these things, the off-going duty officer will then verbally brief the on- 
coming officer about the cases currently active and any other important issues. The on- 
coming officer will assume the watch after acknowledging understanding of the current 
operational situation. A watch relief can be done in as quickly as twenty minutes, or may 
take up to an hour, depending on that day's case load. 
3.        Training 
Each command center designates a training coordinator. Lessons learned or best 
practices identified during a case are promulgated via email, face-to-face, memos, 
procedure updates, or at all-hands meetings.  Formal training usually focuses on search 
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and rescue, since it has the highest case load of all Coast Guard missions. The focus of 
the training is usually the decision support tools (AMS and CASP) that assist in search 
planning.   These tools are used infrequently, because most SAR occurs close to shore, 
which usually does not require extensive searches.  On average, duty officers may only 
use the specialized SAR tools a few times a year. To maintain proficiency, the training 
coordinator will periodically develop training scenarios for the staff to perform. Another 
approach that has been implemented recently involves SAR school instructors making 
periodic visits to command centers to test SAR planning proficiency. 
4.        After Action Reviews 
Post action reviews can take a few different forms.  For example, each morning 
the command duty officer conducts an operations brief for the chain of command to 
summarize what happened, who responded, and the outcome for all cases occurring the 
preceding day.     These briefings often generate discussions leading to immediate 
feedback.   For significant cases (e.g., 199.6 TWA 800 airline crash), formal AARs are 
written and promulgated to each district command center. On a Coast Guard wide basis, 
the service recently implemented an intranet-based system called the Coast Guard 
Standard After Action Information and Lessons Learned System (CG-SAILS). The goal 
of the program is to provide a single, standard means for submitting after action, lessons 
learned, and best practices. Users have the ability to query the system via a web browser 
to read available reports. 
5.        Information Technology Support 
The Coast Guard recently completed a service-wide migration to a Windows NT 
based computer system.   Each desktop PC offers the user the standard Office suite of 
applications (e.g., word-processing, spreadsheet etc.). A centralized IT staff supports the 
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district staff offices, including the command center. Some command centers may have 
someone with an IT background who has developed "home-grown" systems to assist in 
command center work processes. For example, District 11 developed a command center 
intranet that functions as groupware. It provides a centralized location for files, 
documents, procedures and information. District 5 developed an Access database (called 
SMART) to track unit asset readiness. Using SMART, units electronically update their 
listing instead of sending in a status report. These custom solutions require specialized 
knowledge in their development and can be difficult to support by the local IT staff. 
Additionally, there may unknowingly be duplication of efforts among the command 
centers in attempting to solve similar problems. 
B.       KNOWLEDGE ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this step is to identify knowledge that contributes to sustained 
high performance of the horizontal process activities. Knowledge analysis begins by first 
identifying the factors that are critical in successfully responding to SARSAT alerts. This 
step can only be completed after the mission and goal of the organization is fully 
understood. The following list of Critical Success Factors (CSFs) is determined by 
analyzing the horizontal process work flow: 
1. To quickly and effectively analyze the incoming alert. 
2. To formulate a response plan in accordance with Coast Guard procedures. 
3. To provide appropriate assistance and minimize risk to personnel. 
Of particular interest are the activities that contribute significantly to the 
performance of the main process: 
1. Analyze Alert (node 2). 
2. Alert Decision (node 4). 
3. Response Decision (node 6). 
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Achieving success in each of these CSFs and in the overall process is determined 
primarily by the actions taken in the nodes mentioned above. These tasks require a high 
degree of training, experience, and knowledge that contribute significantly to the success 
of the process and highlight their significance in terms of knowledge management. The 
knowledge required for the primary knowledge activities, and how that knowledge is 
acquired, is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
1.        Analyze Alert 
Incoming alerts are received via a dedicated communication line and are 
immediately printed on a stand-alone printer. The alert may be one of thirteen "subject 
indicator type" messages, which are based on whether the originating beacon is a 121.5, 
243 or 406 Mhz beacon. Alerts are received after a satellite completes a pass over a 
particular geographic region. These alerts contain a wealth of information, particularly 
the "406" alerts, which can include owner registration information. Each command 
center has a reference manual (NOAA 1999), that describes the content for each alert 
message. Proficiency in analyzing these alerts is gained primarily from OJT. Table 8 
outlines the knowledge required to perform this activity. 
Knowledge Required 
Competency of 
SARSAT Alert Messages 
Alert Geographic Location 
How Knowledge is Acquired 
• Alert Reference Manual 
• Maritime SAR School 
• On-the-Job Training 
Command and Control PC 
•    On-the-Job Training 
Table 8. Knowledge Analysis of Analyzing Alerts. 
Identifying where a specific alert occurs, or "plots," is critical during this step and 
is the basis for subsequent process tasks. Specialized plotting software is available on a 
command and control PC (C2PC) to manually perform this task.   The 121.5/243 Mhz 
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beacon alerts make up a significant portion of all alerts received and often require careful 
analysis coupled with on-scene unit feedback to locate their specific position. In addition 
to the current alert position, duty officers will maintain a history of plots for all prior 
active alerts, which may collectively provide insights on those hard-to-locate beacons. 
Automating the plotting process would be very beneficial to managing the active alerts 
and conducting analysis. 
Additionally, the SARSAT consortium reports the system will cease processing of 
the 1.21.5/243 Mhz beacon signals in 2009, requiring users to transition to the "406" type 
beacons. These beacons offer superior capabilities (e.g., positioning) compared to the 
older technology beacons and can dramatically reduce efforts used to locate mariners. 
Employing public outreach programs to promote "406" beacons would help facilitate this 
transition and would possibly reduce the number of "121.5" false alerts. 
2.        Alert Decision 
The knowledge required (see Table 9) to make a decision for responding to 
SARSAT alerts can be very complex and must be formulated quickly. The Coast Guard 
has very specific procedures that govern the response. A key job aid is the Command 
Center Quick Reference Sheets (QRSs) that summarize applicable CG procedures and 
specify what type of response is required. QRSs are available for use online and/or in 
hardcopy form. The alert position will be the basis to identify which asset will respond. 
Identifying an appropriate resource (surface or area) necessitates knowing where all the 
assets are home ported, or stationed. Asset status sheets are updated frequently to track 
the assets both underway and at home station. This is a labor intensive task, since 
resource status changes frequently due to mechanical problems or other issues. 
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Knowledge Required 
SAR Response Procedures 
Alert Geographic Location 
Available Resources 
(underway and at home station) 







Maritime SAR School 
OJT, QRS 
Analyze Alert activity 




Maritime SAR School 
QRS, OJT 
OJT, QRS, SAR Manual 
NOAA and USN 
OJT 
OJT 
Table 9. Knowledge Analysis for Alert Decision. 
Other potential resources are underway assets that may be conducting a routine 
patrol or involved in a training mission.  Usually, command centers must first establish 
radio communications (via another unit) to query unit(s) and decide if their current 
position can facilitate a rapid response. However, this step is not necessary for the larger 
cutters, that have the unique capability to provide real-time positioning information sent 
automatically to the command centers. A valuable weather resource is the National Data 
Buoy Center website (NOAA 2000b) that provides real-time wind and seas information 
from coastal buoys positioned around the country.   Weather is a very important factor, 
since it directly effects search area plans and crew risk.    For occasional long-range 
remote alerts, the Automated Mutual-assistance Vessel Rescue (AMVER) system is an 
invaluable resource to identify commercial vessels on transoceanic voyages that may be 
called upon to divert course and assist in investigating SARSAT alerts. 
All these information inputs are reviewed, and the likely response will be for a 
helicopter or fixed-wing aircraft to be launched immediately.   In addition, an Urgent 
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Marine Information Broadcast will be issued to notify mariners in the area of the 
situation. The responding unit at this point will be tasked by SMC to attempt to "home" 
in on the beacon signal using directional finding equipment as they approach the alert 
position. 
3.        Response Decision 
This activity is similar to the alert decision node. The difference is that the initial 
alert response identified a suitable asset to be deployed to investigate the alert position. 
At that point, not much is known concerning the nature of the alert. If the beacon was a 
"406" type, registration information can be referenced to identify the vessel type. The 
SMC will now be relying on the responding unit or on-scene commander (OSC) to 
provide feedback to gain an understanding of the current situation. Table 10 summarizes 
the knowledge required for this phase of the alert. 
Knowledge Required How Knowledge is Acquired 
SAR Response Procedures • Area/District Procedures 
• Maritime SAR School 
• OJT,QRS 
On Scene Situation •   On Scene Commander 
Available Resources 
(underway and at home station) 
•   OJT, Status files, C2PC, Radio 
communications, AMVER 
Search Planning • SAR Manual 
• Area/District Procedures 
• Maritime SAR School 
• QRS,OJT 
Resource Capabilities •   OJT, QRS, SAR Manual 
Weather 
•   OSC,NOAA,NDBC 
Risk Assessment •   OSC, OJT 
Situational Awareness •   OSC, OJT 
Table 10. Knowledge Analysis for Response Decision. 
The situation may range from a vessel in distress to nothing found.  For those 
cases where immediate Coast Guard assistance is required, the SMC evaluates the 
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feedback provided by the OSC and identifies what can be provided. The SMC will also 
evaluate if additional resources are needed. Duty officers rely on OSC feedback and 
Coast Guard policies and experience in making appropriate recommendations to the 
SMC, who makes the final decision. Weather, distance offshore, and asset capabilities 
are key considerations in what further action will be taken. Occasionally, SARSAT alerts 
require extended searches, such as when debris may have been located at the alert 
position. The SMC would then need to provide a search action plan of where the on- 
scene asset should search. If a non-distress situation is identified, the Coast Guard must 
look carefully at the entire situation and either provide assistance or make the opportunity 
for assistance available from a commercial source. 
If no signal or distress situation is found, then the standard first response action is 
to conduct a 6 nautical mile search around the alert position (USCG 1996). 
C.       CONTEXUAL ANALYSIS 
Coast Guard Command Centers are unique organizations in that they serve as the 
apex for ongoing operations. Nine command centers are used to oversee and support 
multi-mission operations throughout the Coast Guard. Looking at the horizontal process 
from a contextual perspective helps identify factors that affect the implementation or 
development of knowledge management systems. The following discussion describes the 
organization and the nature of the underlying task within the horizontal process. 
1.        The Role of Organizational Memory 
Command centers rely on organizational memory for maintaining continuity in 
performing its mission.  The memory is preserved through formal and informal means. 
Most of the retention is through formal recordings to include Coast Guard instructions, 
procedures, quick reference sheets (QRS) and case files. Informal means include email, 
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water cooler discussions, and daily pass-down logs. One significant issue affecting the 
command center memory is the high yearly turnover rate (30% or more) that military 
organizations experience. 
Each case in which a command center takes part is unique. Attempts are made 
locally to capture the tacit knowledge gained from these experiences by conducting all- 
hands meetings, promulgating lessons learned, email communications, and annotating the 
quick reference sheets. However, not all tacit knowledge can be explicitly codified and is 
thereby lost during personnel transfers. 
2.        Structure of the Organization 
A command center follows a military chain of command that requires senior 











Figure 15. Organizational Structure. 
A command center's primary function is to oversee and support ongoing 
operations within its respective area of responsibility.   It is a 24 hour, 7 day a week 
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process that is closely monitored by the entire chain of command. The command center 
reports directly to the department head for the Office of Search and Rescue (OSR). This 
individual is regularly briefed about ongoing operations by phone, face-to-face, pager or 
cell phone. The chief of the command center is headed by a Lieutenant Commander and 
the watch team usually consists of one officer and two enlisted personnel.   The senior 
watch member is the Command Duty Officer (CDO) and serves as a supervisor and 
liaison to the chain of command. Personnel selected for command center duty are closely 
screened to ensure they possess a suitable operational background, have outstanding 
performance appraisals, and excellent communication skills.   This means that a person 
would not normally be assigned to a command center until at least his/her third job 
assignment. The CDOs have usually completed two "afloat" tours, before being assigned 
to the command center as a Lieutenant Junior Grade or Lieutenant.  The Assistant Duty 
Officers (ADOs) tend to be First or Second Class Petty Officers selected from the 
Quartermaster Rate (ship navigators). Quartermasters are selected because their specialty 
often provides the operational experience conducive to working in a command center. 
3. Organizational Incentives 
Organizational incentives for high performance have been established primarily 
through formal means. These incentives are usually military awards for superior 
performance. However, an award also becomes an entry in a member's permanent record 
and can become a factor in promotion and obtaining a desired future job assignment. 
4. Nature of the Underlying Task 
Search and Rescue accounts for a considerable percentage of the time a command 
center spends compared to the other mission areas.  The nature of the SAR mission is a 
prime motivator because duty officers know their actions can directly influence the 
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outcome of assisting a mariner in distress. Duty officers are therefore vigilant to identify 
new procedures and methods, and pass tacit knowledge to their peers.  This knowledge 
can become a significant contributor in solving a unique or difficult SAR case.   Each 
command center case must be handled in an extremely effective and efficient manner. 
Some days can be uneventful and others can be nearly overwhelming in terms of case 
load.   Coast Guard procedures for each mission area (e.g. Search and Rescue, Law 
Enforcement) have been condensed into Quick Reference Sheets (QRSs) that serve as a 
primary job aid in providing specific guidance on what must be done.   The QRSs are 
cross-referenced so that they direct a user to another sheet if a task borders across similar 
processes.   QRSs are evolving documents that are updated frequently to incorporate 
knowledge and maintain their prominence as a duty officer's first reference for guidance 
in completing command center tasks. 
D.       SUMMARY 
The preceding discussions examine the SARSAT process from a knowledge and 
contextual perspective. These analyses are the second and third pillars of the integrated 
framework discussed in Chapter Two and directly contribute to the main process analysis 
performed in Chapter Three. 
The preceding analysis discusses how responding to SARSAT alerts is a 
knowledge intensive process requiring a high degree of training and prior operational 
experience. The knowledge analysis (as did the KOPeR analysis) identified the need to 
employ additional information technology systems to automate some tasks in the 
"analyze alert" and "alert decision" nodes, in order to improve the performance of the 
process.    A significant contextual issue that challenges the ability to maintain the 
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organizational memory is the yearly transfer of personnel. These scheduled job transfers 
are a military norm that require creative methods to counter this threat. From a 
knowledge management perspective, command centers have varying degrees of 
effectiveness in leveraging their available NT computer system to perform core SARSAT 
process functions (e.g., resource availability, case documentation). Alternative 
approaches to address these issues are discussed in the next section. 
E.       ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
The results of the process analysis (from Chapter Three), coupled with the 
knowledge and contextual analysis (in the preceding paragraphs) are used to discuss five 
technological and organizational interventions that offer potential to innovate the 
SARSAT alert process. 
1.        Automating SARSAT Alert Plotting and Management 
Upon arrival, SARSAT alerts are currently manually plotted using specialized 
geographic plotting software. If this task can be automated, it would accelerate alert 
analysis, ease management of all active alerts, and mitigate the potential for human error. 
Automating display of the latitude and longitude of a distress alert would be a significant 
improvement over the current method. However, some additional functionality would 
increase the robustness of such a system. 
First, the duty officers will often be engaged in work away from the immediate 
area of the "alert" computer, necessitating inclusion of an audible signal to call attention 
to their arrival. Having the alert messages automatically printed upon arrival can serve as 
a backup measure to support manual chart plotting if the automated system were to 
experience problems. 
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Another feature for inclusion is an alert "status window" that provides a 
consolidated view of critical information associated with all active alerts. As previously 
mentioned, it takes two satellite passes to compute an alert position, and duty officers are 
particularly interested in knowing at what time the next satellite pass is scheduled to 
occur. Providing a status window would be very beneficial for decision-making and in 
managing all active alerts. 
SARSAT alert information is frequently shared by a District Command Center 
with their outlying units (e.g., groups and air stations), who are tasked in providing a 
response. By leveraging the Coast Guard's intranet, Group units who assume the critical 
SMC role could have electronic access to the alert messages to reap the automated 
plotting and management benefits discussed above. 
2. Command Center Groupware 
The SARSAT analysis above, reveals how case documentation is being 
completed using manual paper-based forms. This inefficient method adversely affects 
both the horizontal and vertical processes by hindering concurrent access to these 
important "working papers." A groupware system can mitigate the concurrent access 
problem and allow case documentation to be stored along with other key process 
knowledge (e.g., QRS response procedures) as discussed in the preceding knowledge 
analysis. 
A unified approach to designing and developing a groupware system is 
recommended. Standardizing locally developed efforts into a common groupware system 
prevents duplication of efforts, facilitates easier system administration, and allows local 
initiatives to be leveraged by all command centers and other units (e.g., Group Operation 
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Centers) that perform similar type functions. One key consideration of this groupware 
system is the need to incorporate suitable backup measures to maintain access to critical 
information during system "down-times." 
3.        Real-Time Position Tracking of Air and Surface Resources 
District   Command  Centers  oversee  current  operations  that  cover  a  wide 
geographic region. Knowing where all currently deployed units are located is essential in 
formulating a response to a SARSAT alert or other mission needs.   The knowledge 
analysis identified how current asset-monitoring methods can be inefficient in tracking 
the position of underway or deployed units. However, the larger Coast Guard cutters do 
have capabilities to provide real-time positioning information to the command centers. 
Resource decisions could be greatly improved, if this electronic reporting system were 
expanded to all Coast Guard District air and surface assets (e.g., patrol boat class and 
larger).   The command centers would then have an up-to-date and inclusive decision 
support system to immediately identify underway asset(s) for use in search and rescue 
and/or other mission needs. 
4. Command Center Staffing 
In the contextual analysis, maintaining the organizational memory was found to 
be challenged by the military norm of transferring personnel every few years. The 
organizational memory base is affected as some knowledge (particularly tacit knowledge) 
is lost as personnel depart for their next assignment. Extending job tour lengths by 
offering job extensions can be an effective measure. However, demands for shore billets, 
job variety, and service needs can challenge efforts to adopt this alternative. 
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A second alternative is to select people already stationed at units that are within 
the same district as the command center where they will be assigned. These personnel 
bring with them a considerable amount of local geographic knowledge and operational 
experience of key Coast Guard missions within that particular district. For example, 
District 7 (covering the Florida area) has a heavy drug interdiction and illegal 
immigration case load. Assigning personnel from these units to the command center 
allows opportunity for local tacit knowledge to be maintained, shared, and leveraged in 
future operations. However, a wide implementation of this alternative can lead to low job 
availability for others desiring assignment, or to lower morale for personnel desiring to 
leave a particular geographic area. 
A third staffing approach in maintaining the organizational memory is to 
maximize augmentation of the command center staff with prior service reserve members. 
Members leaving active duty USCG military service are well suited for this purpose, 
since they often possess the required operational background. Reserve personnel are 
favored because they typically receive less frequent job reassignments. However, the 
benefits provided are not realized on a day-to-day basis, because reservists normally only 
work one weekend a month and a two weeks a year. 
5.        Empowerment 
The process of responding to distress alerts received through the S ARS AT system 
was examined in Chapter Three. It was noted in the KOPeR analysis that feedback 
fraction (Table 7) was high, denoting the process was hindered by excessive "checking 
complexity." When the SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC) responsibility is held at the 
district level, a considerable amount of feedback occurs between the command center and 
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the SMC. This is due to the nature of the mission and military culture. We recommend 
two alternatives that offer potential to reduce the feedback fraction. 
First, fully empower the command centers to make key decisions up to 
established thresholds. This limited delegation of responsibility can be a plausible risk 
considering CDOs (as discussed above in the KM analysis) are carefully selected for 
command center assignments and have completed a rigorous qualification program that 
tests their knowledge and decision-making capability. Having established thresholds 
provides a means to minimize outcomes if a wrong decision is made. 
The second option is to delegate SMC (case ownership) from the district level to 
an outlying group unit. A Coast Guard Group is often better suited to oversee a SARSAT 
case. Groups possess a high level of local knowledge regarding their area of 
responsibility (AOR) and often have better radio communication capabilities to 
communicate directly with responding air and surface assets. Feedback fraction can be 
reduced when a group holds SMC, because they are not required to provide as many 
status reports to their District Command Center. Coast Guard District Eleven has found 
the "feedback fraction" to be effectively reduced by immediately delegating SMC for 
SARSAT alerts plotting within a Group AOR. Other Coast Guard Districts can realize 
these benefits if they adopt a similar policy. 
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V.      CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarizes the purpose of the thesis, the research methodology, and 
conclusions drawn from analyzing the SARSAT alert process to identify performance 
enhancing alternatives. It concludes with recommendations and a proposed area of 
possible future research. 
A. SUMMARY 
Coast Guard Command Centers perform a myriad of processes that coincide with 
the service's multi-mission responsibilities. This thesis examines emergency distress 
alerts received through the SARSAT system, which are important due to the substantial 
number of alerts responded to by the Coast Guard each year. This process is 
representative of the typical functions command centers perform and thereby facilitates 
knowledge management interventions to be leveraged across other related processes. 
The approach used for process analysis draws from current research developed by 
Nissen, Kamel, and Sengupta (2000). This methodology takes an integrated approach by 
focusing on process, knowledge and contextual issues associated with a process to 
identify requirements that facilitate designing of supporting information systems. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, this research identifies five organizational and technological alternatives 
that offer potential to innovate the SARSAT process. These alternatives are identified by 
the KOPeR analysis conducted in Chapter Three and the knowledge and contextual 
analysis conducted in Chapter Four. 
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The organizational alternatives include maximizing job empowerment within 
command centers and outlying units (e.g., groups) to mitigate "feedback fraction" and 
employing unique staffing practices to alleviate the knowledge lost caused by frequent 
job transfers. The three technological alternatives include employing a standardized 
command center groupware system, electronic plotting and management of SARSAT 
alerts, and expanding the current real-time tracking capability to include all Coast Guard 
District air and surface assets. 
Adopting these alternatives can lead to greater overall process performance. 
Particularly, in analyzing SARSAT alerts, managing information/knowledge can be 
improved, and making critical response decisions can be enhanced.    An in depth 
discussion of these alternatives is provided in Chapter Four. 
C.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the course of this research, two recommendations are identified that offer 
potential to improve the Coast Guard's response to SARSAT alerts and foster knowledge 
transfer among the District Command Centers:   1) public outreach, and 2) virtual 
discussion board. These two recommendations are discussed below: 
1.        Public Outreach 
The first recommendation is for the Coast Guard to maximize efforts to ensure the 
public is aware of benefits of "406" beacons and the upcoming 2009 termination date for 
processing of "121.5" beacon alerts. The recent technological improvements of "406" 
EPRIBs make it important to promote beacons that also feature the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) capability. Currently, if the receiving satellite fails to obtain a sufficient 
duration of signal to perform Doppler analysis (for positioning computations), it will 
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result in what is commonly called a "missed pass." However, a "406" beacon having the 
enhanced positioning capability can still relay a GPS position through the SARSAT 
system. This can mitigate the "missed pass" problem and allow command centers to 
immediately dispatch resources to the GPS position, rather than waiting up to 50 minutes 
for the next satellite pass. Moreover, the error associated with GPS positions can be 100 
meters or less, making it easier to locate the mariner and minimize the need for extensive 
searches. These GPS capable beacons cost a few hundred dollars more, but their benefits 
can be easily articulated to justify their purchase. 
Wide adoption of these enhanced "406" beacons offers significant potential to aid 
duty officers during the "analyze alert" and "alert decision" nodes of the SARSAT alert 
process. The Coast Guard Auxiliary and Marine Safety Vessel Inspectors are two logical 
avenues to promote these enhanced "406" beacons to the public and private sectors of the 
maritime community. 
2.        Virtual Discussion Board 
In the research, it is noted the richest source of knowledge can often be provided 
through informal means. The evolution of the internet and intranets has led to online 
discussion boards (e.g. Military.com), that create an informal environment, but in a 
virtual setting. This is particularly useful for participants that are separated by time and 
distance, such as the nine Coast Guard Command Centers located throughout the United 
States. Employing an online discussion board within the Coast Guard intranet would 
serve as a means to draw the command centers together to engage in "water-cooler" type 
discussions. 
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Expected benefits of a virtual discussion board include fostering discussions that 
can lead to new ideas, exchanging of lessons learned, and sharing of locally developed 
best practices. 
D.       FUTURE RESEARCH 
The integrated analysis performed in this thesis demonstrates the robustness of the 
framework. This approach examines not only the process at large, but the knowledge and 
contextual issues (that other methodologies may overlook) that affect successful 
implementation of knowledge management innovations. 
This thesis focuses on applying the integrated framework in a Search and Rescue 
application, but this methodology could be leveraged in other Coast Guard mission areas 
that also perform knowledge intensive processes. In particular, cutter training is a 
promising area for this approach. 
Crews assigned to a Coast Guard Medium and High Endurance Cutter are 
required to participate in periodic proficiency training. The goal is to provide a training 
environment to assess the ability of the cutter to perform its missions and improve its 
training team skills. Crew proficiency is evaluated by expert "ship riders" who oversee 
drills conducted by onboard training teams (e.g., damage control, navigation and 
seamanship). It's the responsibility of the training teams to conduct the drills, identify 
problems, train crewmembers, and ensure safety during the exercises. 
The training cycle is usually one or two years in length and has the following 
process flow: 1) pre-inspection—to assess crew strengths and weaknesses; 2) 
inspection/training—to perform a re-inspection of weak areas and conduct training with 
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subject matter experts, and 3) post-inspection—correcting remaining deficiencies and 
conducting routine proficiency training. 
Examining the three phase training cycle using the integrated knowledge 
management and system design framework may identify interventions that offer potential 
to innovate cutter training program. This can lead to a more effective means in attaining 
a peak level of cutter readiness. 
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